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FROM AAA TO F: HOW THE CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES FAILED AMERICA
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO
PROTECT INVESTORS
Abstract: In the fallout from the current economic crises, many have
struggled to determine what went wrong. One factor contributing to the
massive combustion of the U.S. financial markets (and thus the economy
as a whole) was investors' heavy reliance on inaccurate, inflated credit rat-
ings. Because of the long entrenchment of credit ratings in the regulatory
structure and, perhaps more significantly, in the investment culture, re-
ducing the reliance on those ratings is unlikely. This Note summarizes the
increased reliance on credit rating agencies and credit ratings in the regu-
latory structure and examines some suggested models for reform. It ar-
gues that present reform efforts, however, address superficial flaws in the
regulatory structure and fail to confront the real issues that undermine
the validity of credit ratings. This Note proposes a model for regulating
credit rating agencies in a manner akin to the regulation of broker-dealers,
through a self-regulatory organization. It argues that the SEC should seek
to ensure the transparency and integrity of the markets by facilitating,
through regulatory requirements, the formation of a self-regulatory or-
ganization with oversight of and responsibility for credit rating agencies.
This financial crisis was not inevitable . . . . I0Jur regulations lagged behind
changes in our markets—and too often., regulators failed to use the authority
that they had to protect consumers, markets and the economy.
—President Barack Obama'
INTRODUCTION
On the afternoon of Friday, March 14, 2008, Moody's Investors
Services and Standard & Poor's both announced they were downgrad-
ing the ratings of the renowned investment bank, Bear Stearns. 2 By
Sunday evening, just two days later, officials from the U.S. Department
I President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Regulatory Reform Meet-
ing (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-after-regulatory-reform-meeting/.
2 Dakin Campbell, Bear Gets Double Daumgoad4 BOND Bum, Mar., 17, 2008,
http://vnvw.bondbuyer.com/ar
 ticle.horil?id=200803 I 4V6C1161B.
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of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board stepped in to negotiate
the sale of Bear Stearns, one of the world's largest investment banks, to
JP Morgan Chase.3 Bear Stearns, which less than two years prior held
assets of $350.4 billion and total capital of $66.7 billion, sold for a mea-
ger $1.2 billion by the end of the month. 4 Thus was the inglorious end
to an eighty-five year-old Wall Street institution that had weathered se-
rious economic downtimes from the Great Depression to the credit
crunch of the 1970s.°
Although Bear Stearns' collapse was stunning, it was merely a pre-
view to the financial crisis that ensued, a crisis that has been marked by
the evaporation of Wall Street's most venerable institutions and the
erosion of the national and international economies.° As the country
continues to reel from the crisis, the discourse has inevitably turned
toward assigning blame.' Many parties share in the responsibility for
creating the toxic brew that brought about the financial collapse and
subsequent economic crisis. The nation's credit rating agencies, how-
ever, are and will remain on the receiving end of much of the finger
poin ting. 8
The criticisms currently pointed at the credit rating agencies, and
those entities charged with regulating them, are remarkably similar to
the criticisms those parties faced following the collapse of energy-giant
Enron just six years earlier.° Enron declared bankruptcy days after hav-
John Waggoner & David Lynch, Red Flags in Bear Stearns' Collapse, USA TODAY, Mar.
17, 2008, at 1A.
4 THE 13F-AR STEARNS Cos., 2006 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT exhibit 13, 45 (2007);
Landon Thomas, Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at Cl.
5 Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 17,
2008, http://www.nytimes.corn/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html.
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/151ehman.html?_r=1 &scp=
1&sq=lehman%20brothers%20rnerrill%2Olynch&st=cse. The September 2008 collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the sale of Merrill Lynch are further examples of the pervasiveness
of the crisis. See id.
7 See Marie Leone, Subprime Slam: SEC Exposes Rating Agency Faults, CFO.com, July 8,
2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11699984?fr --related (last visited Sept. 18, 2009);
Twenty-five People to Blame for the Financial Crisis, Time.com , http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1878509,00.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
8 See, e.g., Thomas Frank, The "Market" Isn't So Wire After All, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at
A7; Leone, supra note 7; Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers,
N.Y. Timm, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/economy/
23rating.html?sq1&sq.credit%2Orating%20agencies&st=cse.
9 Compare Leone, supra note 7 (discussing the SEC's scrutiny of credit rating agency ac-
tions in light of the subprirne mortgage crisis), with Edward Wyatt, Enron's Many Strands:
Warning Signs; Credit Agencies Waited Months to Voice Doubts About Enron, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 8,
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ing its credit rating downgraded.") The common thread between these
two events is the backlash they prompted against the credit rating agen-
cies responsible for assessing the risks of financial products and debt-
ors.n Then, as no the government took action to improve regulatory
oversight of the credit rating agencies in the hopes that future financial
crises could be avoided.' 2
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of credit rating agencies
and the regulatory regime governing thern.is It then explains how the
products of rating agencies (the ratings themselves) have become in-
creasingly integrated into governmental oversight of the financial mar-
kets while oversight of the rating agencies themselves has remained
stagnant." Part H looks at the regulation of the market in the current
financial crisis. 15
 Part III examines several of the proposed reforms in
the regulation of rating agencies and examines the advantages and dis-
advantages of those models. 16
 This part considers proposals by market
participants and observers, as well as recent actions by the SEC and sev-
eral congressional committees." Part IV argues that the best approach
to effectively regulating credit rating agencies and their work product is
balancing the oversight authority of the SEC with the expertise of mar-
ket-participants through a self-regulatory organization modeled on the
self-regulatory organization currently overseeing broker-dealers."'
I. REGULATING THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: A BRIEF HISTORY
' Before 2009, the regulation of credit rating agencies arose almost
exclusively from the process of achieving the designation of a Nation-
ally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization ("NRSRO"). 19 Because
2002, at Cl (discussing the failure of the credit rating agencies to respond to weaknesses in
Enron's finances).
10 See Wyatt, supra note 9.
11 See Morgenson, supra note 8; Wyatt, supra note 9.
12 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21,123 Stat. 1616 (2009);
Michael L. Siegel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008) (discussing remedial actions taken by Congress and
the Department ofJustice after the illegal activity at Enron came to light).
15 See infra notes 19-99 and accompanying text.
14
 See infra notes 69-99 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 100-146 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 147-204 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 147-204 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 205-224 and accompanying text.
19 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RAT-
ING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION or ME SECURITIES MARKETS: As REQUIRED BY SECTION
1278	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 50:1275
federal regulations provide incentives for broker-dealers to hold debt
that has received an investment-grade rating from at least two NRSROs
and some regulated investors are limited to investing in securities rated
investment-grade, obtaining this designation can be very valuable and
profitable to any credit rating agency. 2°
Thus, the role of the credit rating agencies and the regulatory
structures that govern those agencies have evolved significantly since
their inception in the early twentieth century, and this can only be ex-
pected to continue in light of the current economic crisis and the con-
troversy surrounding the rating agencies' role.21
A. The Historical Role of Credit Rating Agencies
A credit rating agency is a person or organization that issues credit
ratings for a reasonable fee; uses a quantitative or qualitative model, or
both, to determine credit ratings; and receives fees from issuers, inves-
tors, or other market participants, or a combination thereof. 22 These
agencies rate debt instruments and companies on a scale ranging from
AAA, the highest rating, to junk bonds, the lowest, though each credit
rating agency uses its own set of symbols. 23 The ratings are significant
for two reasons: (1) many entities, such as pension plans or other gov-
ernment-regulated investment groups, are restricted to purchasing
products that are rated investment grade 24 by a NRSRO; and (2) ratings
702(B) OF THE SARBANFS-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 5 (2004) [hereinafter REPORT ON TIIE
ROLE AND F'UNC'TION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES].
" See id. at 6-7 ("Although the Commission originated the use of the term 'NRSRO' in
regulation, ratings by NRSROs today are widely used as benchmarks in federal and state
legislation, rules issued by financial and other regulators, foreign regulatory schemes, and
private financial contracts.").
21 See id. at 6.
" U.S. SEC. AND EXCII. COMM'N, OVERSIGHT OF NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL
RATING ORGANIZMIONS: A SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, available at lutp://www.
sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmcompliance/nrsro-secg.htm
 {last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
" See FrItIl RATINGS, DEFINITIONS OF RATINGS AND OTHER SCALES 5-6 (2009), available at
http://wwwAtchratings.corn/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_satles.pdf;
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S RATING SYMBOLS & DEFINITIONS 8 (2008), available at
http://v2.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/29/2006600000424852.pdf?frame
OfRef=corporate; STANDARD & POOR'S, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DEFINITIONS 4-11
(2009), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pcif/focedincome/Ratings_
Definitons Update.pdf.
" Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008). An investment-grade rating is a rat-
ing that reflects a higher opinion on the creditworthiness of debtor or obligation being
rating. Investment-grade ratings are rated BBB and higher, while non-investment grade
credit ratings are BB and below. See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n., Credit Rating Agen-
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impact the marketplace because investors rely on them as an accurate
reflection of the creditworthiness of the product or company. 25 It is im-
portant to note, however, that these ratings are merely opinions as to
the creditworthiness of the entity or the financial product at a particu-
lar point in time, 26
Credit ratings were developed in the early twentieth century by
John Moody, founder of Moody's Investor Services. 27 The purpose of
publishing ratings was to provide investors with information about the
quality of corporate bonds. 28
 Early rating agencies profited by selling
their ratings to potential investors seeking information about the per-
ceived likelihood of default. 29
 When the changing nature of capital
markets rendered this practice no longer profitable, rating agencies
began selling their services to the debt issuers themselves, relying on
their reputations to give their voices credibility. 3°
The most well-known rating agencies in the United States are
Moody's Investor Services, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch." Standard
& Poor's issues nearly half of all credit ratings and together with
Moody's and Fitch, the so-called "Big Three" issue ninety-eight percent
of the total ratings. 32
The Big Three rating agencies dominated the field early on by be-
ing designated as NRSROs by the Securities and Exchange Commission
cies—NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm
 (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (here-
inafter Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs].
23 STAFF OF S, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVER-
SIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 76 (Comm. Print 2002).
20 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 815-19
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that in the case of Enron, the national credit rating agencies
were entitled to first amendment protection against lender's claims regarding negligent
misrepresentation of debtor's creditworthiness). The court in In re Enron found that credit
rating agencies have a qualified protection under the First Amendment. See id. at 819
("[T]his Court will not assume blanket protection for the Credit Agency ratings, but will
consider any First Amendment proteCtion for credit rating reports as qualified and will
scrutinize the facts alleged according to standards and heightened pleading requirements
developed by courts to determine whether ... [the plaintiff] has stated a claim that is not
precluded by First Amendment protection.") .; see also REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at 5.
27 See Moody's History: A Century of Market Leadership, http://www.moodys.com/
moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=history (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
28 See id.
28 See id.
go See id.
3 ' See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Commis-
sion Open Meeting (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/
spch120308k1c.htm#P23_2884.
32 Id.
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("SEC" or "the Commission") in 1975. 33 An NRSRO is a credit rating
agency that is registered with the SEC. 34 In recent history, the regula-
tion of credit rating agencies has arisen almost exclusively from the
process of achieving the designation of a NRSRO. 35 In practice, the
SEC designated a rating agency as an NRSRO by issuing a no-action
letter; once issued, the designation was not formally reviewed at any
interval, though it could be revoked. 36
The process of reviewing NRSROs was fairly informal and the
standards considered by the SEC for granting the no-action letter were
opaque." Generally, the staff of the SEC's Division of Market Regula-
tion reviewed the rating agency's business using discretionary guide-
lines; its primary consideration was the national recognition of the
agency as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant
users of securities ratings." Additional considerations included organ-
izational structure, financial resources, rating procedures, and internal
controls.39 Upon making its determination, the only result was the
Commission staffs issuance of the no-action letter stating it would not
recommend that the Commission take enforcement action if broker-
dealers relied on ratings from that rating agency in applying the Net
Capital Rule.°
At preient, the SEC has designated ten rating agencies as NRSROs:
A.M. Best Company, Inc.; DBRS Ltd.; Egan-Jones Rating Company;
Fitch, Inc.; Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.; LACE Financial Corp.;
Moody's Investor Service, Inc.; Rating and Investment Information,
Inc.; Realpoint LLC; and Standard & Poor's Rating Services. 41
33 Lawrence 1. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis
11 {Feb. 12, 2001) {unpublished manuscript, available at http://wwwstern.nyu.edu/eco/
wkpapers/workingpapers01/01-02White.pdf) .
54 Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, supra note 24.
33 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 109TH CONG , CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACC OF 2006,
at 3 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter CRS Report].
36 See Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,018, 68,019 (proposed Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240) (not acted upon); CRS REPORT, supra note 35, at 3.
37 CRS Report, supra note 35, at 3.
38 Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 62 Fed. Reg. at 68,019.
33 Id.
4° Id.; see infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Net Capital Rule).
-"Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, supra note 24.
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B. The Net Capital Rule: Regulatory Integration of the' NRSRO Designation.
The first appearance of the term NRSRO was in the Commission's
1975 revisions to the Net Capital Rule. 42
 The Net Capital Rule, Rule
15c3-1, seeks to ensure that broker-dealers have sufficient "liquid assets
to meet their obligations to their investors and creditors." 43 The Rule
requires broker-dealers to maintain net capital over some specified
amount." In calculating the minimum net capital, broker-dealers de-
duct percentages of the market value of their securities from their total
net worth. 45
 Taking such actions are a way of protecting against fluctua-
tions in the prices of broker-dealers' proprietary positions. 46
The 1975 revisions to the rule permitted banks to base their capi-
tal requirements on the quality of the securities they held by subjecting
them to lower margin requirements if those securities were rated in-
vestment grade by at least two NRSROs. 47 In revising the Net Capital
Rule, however, the SEC did not define the term NRSRO nor did it indi-
cate how rating agencies would achieve the designation. 48 In setting
margin requirements based on the ratings of private ratings agencies,
the SEC formalized the rote of rating agencies in U.S. financial mar-
kets.49 The Commission outsourced its regulatory responsibilities to
these nongovernmental actors without providing any guidance or many
discreet requirements'. 50
42 Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1976).
45 Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 Bus. L. 863, 863 (1991-1992). This Note
provides only a superficial discussion of the intricacies of the Net Capital Rule. Michael
Jamroz, a former branch chief of the Division of Market Regulation at the SEC, offers a
detailed analysis of the rule and the implications for investment practices. See generally id.
44 Id. at 866.
45 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1; see also REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RAT-
ING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at 6.
46 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (vi) (E) (haircuts for commercial paper rated in one
of the highest three categories by at least two NRSROs); id. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (vi) (F)
(haircuts for noncovertible debt securities rated in one of the highest four categories by at
least two NRSROs); id. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (vi) (1-1) (haircuts for cumulative, nonconvertable
preferred stock rated in one of the highest four categories by at least two NRSROs); see also
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release Nos. 33-7085, 34-34616, IC-
20508, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,314, 46,314 n.2 (proposed Sept. 7,-1994); Jamroz, supra note 43, at
863-65.
42
 Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 46,314; see
also REPORT ON TnE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at 6;
Jamroz, supra note 43, at 16-17 & n.5.
4° See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 46,314-
17.
49 See Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
5° See id.; see also Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: hoar Kreriger;
the Dedit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26
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Perhaps in recognition of their cession of authority, the SEC pro-
posed to define the term NRSRO in 1997.51
 The proposal arose out of
the SEC's 1994 Concept Release ("Concept Release')." In the Concept
Release, the Conunission sought comments on "the appropriate role of
ratings in the federal securities laws, and the need to establish formal
procedures for designating and monitoring the activities of NRSROs. "53
The SEC pointed out that it had not defined the term NRSRO for the
purposes of the Net Capital Rule, and, since 1975, had used the term in
other regulations while generally stating that it should have the same
meaning as under the Net Capital Rule. 54 Additionally, the SEC recog-
nized that concern had arisen over the lack of oversight over the
NRSROs' functions. 55
After soliciting comments, the Commission promulgated a pro-
posed rule that sought to amend the Net Capital Rule to define
NRSRO, as well as lay out specific criteria for rating agencies to achieve
the designation.56 At the time, the SEC considered amending the rule
in part because of an ever increasing reliance on the term NRSRO in
state and federal regulation.57 Indeed, in the proposed rule, the SEC
pointed to Congress's use of the term in the Secondary Mortgage Mar-
ket Enhancement Act of 1984 to define, in part, mortgage related secu-
rities.58 The SEC has used the term NRSRO and relied on the use of
the term in the Net Capital Rule, in regulations adopted pursuant to
the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Com-
pany Act. 59 Moreover, Congress has relied on the ratings of NRSROs
YALE J. ON REG. 431, 432, 438-40 (2009) (discussing how regulatory reliance on credit
rating agencies began during the Great Depression and noting that regulators "dele-
gate[ed1 responsibility to credit-rating agencies").
51 Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,018, 68,020-21 (proposed Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240) (not acted upon).
52
 Id. at 68,020.
" Id.
54 Id.
55 REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at
11.
5° Id. at 12.
52 Id. at 6.
513 Id. at 7-8 (citing Pub. L. 98-440, § 101, 98 Seat. 1689 (1984) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (1988))).
" REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at
6-7.
For example, Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 limits
money market funds to investing in only high quality short-term instruments,
and NRSRO ratings are used as benchmarks for establishing minimum quality
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when defining "mortgage-backed securities," requiring that "such secu-
rities be rated in one of the two highest rating categories by at least one
NRSRO."6°
The 1997 Proposed Rule would have required credit rating agen-
cies to meet the following criteria to be eligible for the NRSRO desig-
nation: (1) national recognition; (2) adequate staffing, financial re-
sources, and organizational structure; (3) use of systemic rating
procedures that are designed to ensure credible and accurate ratings;
(4) extent of contacts between agencies and the management of the
issuers; and (5) internal control procedures to prevent misuse of non-
public information and compliance with such procedures. 61 These re-
quirements are quite similar to the criteria the Commission applied in
its .informal process for issuing no-action letters.62 The Proposed Rule
would have required rating agencies seeking NRSRO status to register
as an investment advisor under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 63
Additionally, the proposed rule would have set into the regulatory re-
gime a process for recognizing and designating a rating agency as an
NRSRO and would have required designated agencies to report mate-
rial changes under. the definition to the SEC. 64 Furthermore, the pro-
posal sought comments from stakeholders about whether or not
NRSROs' fee structures should be regulated, whether ratings should be
made publically available, and whether there were ways to use statistical
models for determining credit risk of specific financial instruments that
could be used in place of NRSRO credit ratings. 65
investment standards.. _In addition, . . . offerings of certain nonconvertable
debt, preferred securities, and asset-backed securities that are rated invest-
ment grade by at least one NRSRO can be registered on ... the Commission's
"short-form" registration statement—without the issuer satisfying a minimum
public float test.
Id. at 7.
6°
 Id. at 7-8.
61 Capital Requirements for Brokers or. Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,018, 68,020 (proposed Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240) (not acted upon).
62 Id.; REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, SUPra note
19, at 13.
63 Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 62 Fed. Reg. at 68,020-21.
64 Id. at 68,019; REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, St/-
Pra note 19, at 13.
65 Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 62 Fed. Reg. at 68,021-23; REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT' RATING
AGENCIES, supra note 19, at 13-15. It is worth noting that the Proposed Rule would have all
but guaranteed the existing NRSROs continued status because the new guidelines relied
1284	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 50:1275
Ultimately, the SEC chose not to act on its proposed rule. 66
 In a
2003 Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the
Operation of the Securities Markets, the SEC cited concerns regarding
"the standards defining the term `NRSRO,' and the initiation of broad-
based Commission and Congressional reviews of credit rating agen-
cies," as its reason for declining to act on the Proposed Rule. 67 Specifi7
call); the Commission observed that most market participants and ob-
servers were opposed to the idea of regulatory oversight of NRSROs
where such oversight might "interfere with a rating agency's credit rat-
ing process or rating judgments."68
C. The Enron Effect
After the Commission's inaction in the late 1990s, their oversight
of the credit rating agencies came under attack again in 2001. 69 Late
that year, energy giant Enron declared bankruptcy a mere four days
after having its credit rating downgraded by the NRSROs Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. 79 Investors, Congress, and the public re-
acted with frustration and anger at the ratings agencies' delay in down-
grading Enron's credit rating despite warnings of trouble within the
firm. 71 In October of the following year, the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs held hearings on the public- and private-sector over-
seers of Enron's finances. 72 The Committee subsequently issued a de-
tailed report entitled, Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and
Private-Sector Watchdogs, which recommended increased oversight for
the rating agencies. 73
The Committee's report noted, futher, that since the first use of
the term NRSRO in 1975, eight federal statutes, forty-seven federal
regulations, and more than one hundred state laws and regulations had
heavily on the existing procedure in informing the structure and reasoning for issuing a
no-action letter. See Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 62 Fed. Reg. at 68,019-24.
66 JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
291-92 (2006).
87
 REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at
15.
68
 Id. at 12.
13° Id. 16-18.
7° Wyatt, supra note 9.
71 Id.
72 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107m CONG., FINANCIAL OVER-
SIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS I (Comm. Print 2002).
75 Id. at 98-99.
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been written with reference to or reliance on NRSRO credit ratings. 74
While government reliance on credit ratings as a regulatory touchstone
was increasing, reliability of the ratings themselves was declining. 75
1. SEC Efforts to Regulate in a Post-Enron Environment
In addition to Congress's study, the Commission conducted its own
inquiry into the role and function of the credit rating agencies pursuant
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.76 In its report, the SEC announced its
intent to issue proposed rules in response to its findings." On April 25,
2005, the SEC published a proposed rule to define the term NRSRO. 78
The goal of the definition was to identify credit rating agencies whose
ratings would be reliable such that the Commission could confidently
rely on those ratings when using them to underpin regulations. 79 To
that end, the proposed rule defined the term NRSRO as:
[A]n entity that (i) issues publicly available credit ratings that
are current assessments of the creditworthiness of obligors
with respect to specific securities or money market instru-
ments; (ii) is generally accepted in the financial markets as an
issuer of credible and reliable ratings ... ; and (iii) uses sys-
tematic procedures designed to ensure credible and reliable
ratings, manage potential conflicts of interest, and prevent the
74 Id. at 79.
75
 Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies, Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets] (statement of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A.
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School),
76 See REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note
19, at 3.
" Id. at I.
78
 Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg.
21,306 (proposed April 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 290) (not acted upon).
The Proposed Rule reflected issues raised in the Commission's 2003 Concept Release. See
Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, Release
Nos. 33-8236, 39-47972, 68 Fed. Reg. 35.258, 35,259-64 ( June 12, 2003); see also Definition
of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. at 21,306, 21,309-22.
The rule, however, pertains only to defining the term NRSRO and does not consider the
other issues raised by the 2003 Concept Release. See Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit
Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258; Definition of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. at 21,306, 21,310-19.
79
 Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. at
21,310.
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misuse of nonpublic information, and has sufficient financial
resources to ensure compliance with those procedures.° '
The 2005 Proposed Rule was not adopted by the SEC because of con-
gressional concern that the Commission's statutory authority did not
extend to overseeing the credit rating agency industry. 81 The potential
gap in statutory authority arises from the indirect nature of the SEC's
oversight of NRSROs' designation. Once a credit rating agency has ap-
plied to the SEC, the SEC agrees not to take action against broker-
dealers that rely on those credit ratings in adhering to regulatory re-
quirements.82 Because issuers will purchase credit ratings from NRSROs
in order to facilitate investment from broker-dealers who must adhere
to SEC requirements, the regulation of the NRSRO is intended to be a
method by which the SEC regulates broker-dealers, not the NRSROs
themselves.° This gives rise to concern that the SEC has uncertain au-
thority to conduct further oversight of NRSROs or to look deeply at the
inner workings of the agencies themselves. 84
2. Seeking Statutory Authority
In light of the SEC's perceived lack of statutory authority, as well as
its own qualms about the role of NRSROs, Congress enacted the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act ("CRA Reform Act"). 88 In the Act's findings,
Congress recognized the national importance of credit rating agencies,
acknowledged that the oversight of credit rating agencies served the
compelling interest of investor protection, and observed that the Com-
mission required additional statutory authority to oversee the agen-
cies.°
The CRA Reform Act addressed these concerns in several ways.
First, it amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide statu-
tory definitions for the terms "credit rating," "credit rating agency,"
110 Id.
81 See 123 CoNG. REC. E1957 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Fitzpatrick)
(citing Carroll, infra note 84, at 5).
82 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
al See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 46,314; see
also REPORT ON 'TH E ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 19, at 6;
jantroz, supra note 43, at 16-17 & n.5.
84 Brian Carroll, Ennrn Scandals Spur Proposed. Credit Rating Legislation, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Sept. 25, 2005, at 5.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a, 78o-7 (West Supp.
2008).'
88 Id.
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"nationally recognized statistical rating organization," "person associ-
ated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization," and
"qualified institutional buyer," thereby intending to address the Com-
mission's informal and indeterminate approach to NRSROs. 87
The CRA Reform Act further added Section 15E to the Securities
Exchange Act to set out procedures for registration of NRSROs. 88 In an
effort to increase transparency, the Act called for rating agencies seek-
ing the treatment of an NRSRO to provide information regarding credit
ratings performance; the procedures and methodologies for determin-
ing ratings; policies to prevent misuse of nonpublic information; organ-
izational structure of the agency; whether or not the agency has a code
of ethics; conflicts of interest relating to the issuance of ratings; catego-
ries of products that the agency seeks registration to rate; information
about the largest issuers and subscribers, by net revenue, using the
agencies' services; and other information.89 Finally, the CRA Reform Act
calls on the SEC to "amend or revise [its] rules and regulations ... as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."90 This gives the Commission further authority to oversee the
credit rating agencies in an effort to protect investors and the public. 91
3. The SEC Takes Action
Armed with the necessary statutory authority, in 2007 the SEC im-
plemented new rules under the CRA Reform Act. 92 The 2007 rules ap-
plied the requirements Congress set out for achieving recognition as an
NRSRO in the CRA Reform Act on an ongoing basis through continual
disclosures.93 The rules required agencies seeking designation as an
NRSRO to disclose their procedures and methodologies for assigning
aT Id. The CRA Reform Act defines an NRSRO as a credit rating agency that has been
in business for at least the three consecutive years prior to its application; issues credit
ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers in one ore more of a number of catego-
ries; and is registered as an NRSRO under Section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act. Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
" Id. §§ 78a, 78o-7(n) (2) (B).
91 See CRA Reform Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a, 78o-7(n) (2) (B),
" Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b (2007). In 2007, seven credit rating agencies
registered with the SEC as NRSROs. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Conun'n, Seven
Credit Rating Agencies Registered with the SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-199.htm
 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Seven Credit Rating Agencies].
93 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.
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ratings. 94
 Additionally, the agencies that obtained the designation as
NRSROs were required to disclose to the public specific performance
measurement statistics including historical downgrades and default
rates.95
 In addition to being certified annually, this information had to
be updated should it become materially inaccurate. 96
Like the CRA Reform Act, the motivation for the SEC's regulations
was improving transparency of the credit rating process. This philoso-
phy, which underscores federal securities law, "is premised upon the
belief that, so long as there is full and accurate disclosure of all material
information by a covered company, the investing public will have suffi-
cient information upon which to make its investment decisions." 97 This
notion is itself based on a primary presumption that the NRSROs will
engage in better practices when subjected to public scrutiny." Thus, it
fails to account for market influences that cannot be mitigated through
good-faith efforts on the part of the credit rating agencies; these influ-
ences have become the biggest crisis facing rating agencies hi capital
markets—high volumes of incredibly sophisticated, complex financial
products that cannot, or at least have not, been rated with the same
measure of accuracy as other types of financial products. 99
II. REGULATING THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
Despite the regulatory response to the Enron crisis, the credit rat-
ing agencies found themselves amidst controversy again when, in 2008,
many subprirne residential mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS") be-
gan to default and were subjected to rating downgrades)°° Although
many participants share responsibility for the crumbling financial mar-
94 Id.; Seven Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 92.
96
 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.
96 Erik Sirri, Dir., Div of Market Reg., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
SEC Open Meeting: Final Rules Implementing the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
(May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch052307ers.htm.
97 CRS Report, supra note 35, at 5.
99 See id.
9
"3 See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 75, at 4-10 (statement of Professor
John C. Coffee, Jr.); Roman Frydman et al., We Must Not Rely Only on the Rosiest Ratings, FIN.
TIMES, (Oct. 19, 2008) http://www.ft.com/ (search "Rely Only on the Rosiest Ratings"; then
following hyperlink with title); see also CRS Report, supra note 35, at 5.
100 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2008), available athttp://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf [hereinafter PWG March Policy Statement).
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ket, regulators have cited credit ratings in general and credit rating
agencies in particular, as having failed the marketplace.'°'
A. Downgrading Credit Ratings in the Current Crisis
Despite the reforms made to the regulation of capital markets in
the early part of the decade, the current turmoil in the financial mar-
kets has left regulators and government entities struggling to determine
what went wrong and why.'" Indeed, the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets ("President's Working Group") has considered the
issue at length and drawn several conclusions.'" They point out that
investors were relying "excessively on credit ratings, which contributed
to [the investors') complacency about the risks they were assuming in
pursuit of higher returns."'" This stemmed, in large part, from the in-
creasingly complex products in the financial industry, which in turn,
forced investors to rely more heavily on the assessment of the "ex-
perts." 1 °5
 The credit ratings produced by credit rating agencies, however,
were not as reliable, and thus were more likely to default than in previ-
ous years. 1" For example, a study by financial economists showed that
the five-year cumulative default rate on corporate bonds rated "Baa" by
Moody's between 1983 and 2005 was 2.2%, but the rate between 1994
and 2005 on collateralized debt obligations comparably rated was
24%. 107
 Thus, when corporate bonds and collateralized debt obligations
received identical ratings, those ratings represented vastly different
101 Id. atl.
1° 2 See id. at i,1
103 See PWG March Policy Statement, supra note 100, at 1 (noting the principle causes
of the crisis in the financial markets); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MARKETS, PRO-
GRESS UPDATE ON MARCH POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1-6
(2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/q4progress%20update.pdf
thereinafter PWG October Policy Statement].
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets was established by Executive
Order in 1988 in response to the market crisis of 1987. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed,
Reg. 9421, 9421 (Mar. 22, 1988); Nathaniel C. Nash, Stock-Fall Study Gets Chairman, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1988, at 013 ("1 -11 he President's interagency committee ... seeks to pro-
duce a unified series of White House recommendations on how to avoid another stock
market crash."). It is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and its members include the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Chairman of the SEC,
and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Exec. Order No.
12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. at 9421.
I" PWG March Policy Statement, supra note 100, at 2.
105 Id.
1°6 Id.
107
 Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 75, at 5 (statement of Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr.).
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opinions of creditworthiness. 108 Because financial products were becom-
ing increasingly complex, the relative risk associated with a particular
credit rating increased. 06 Investor behavior, however, was not corre-
spondingly more prudent, and it is rational to conclude that investors
imputed the relative risk to the rating itself, rather than the product it-
self."6
The trouble materialized when confidence in credit ratings on
some products, namely subprime RMBS, began to erode. The seeds of
doubt sown, confidence fell in the entire asset-backed commercial pa-
per market because the NRSROs issued extensive downgrades even on
newly rated securities." Downgrading newly rated securities sends the
message to the market and to investors that these securities, and per-
haps others, were not effectively rated from the outset. 112 Such mes-
sages can only serve to create additional anxiety, an emotion that does
not contribute to growing capital markets."
B. Recommendations in Light of the Downgradings
In response to the market crises, the President's Working Group
issued many recommendations. 114 These recommendations include
improving the integrity and transparency of the credit rating agencies'
processes and practices and taking steps to ensure that the world's fi-
nancial institutions manage risk more effectively." 5 Specifically, the
President's Working Group recommends that credit rating agencies
disclose the nature of the qualitative reviews they perform on origina-
tors; require the underwriters of asset-backed securities to disclose the
due diligence performed on the underlying assets; manage conflicts of
interest; assist investors in understanding credit ratings by making pub-
lic information regarding their rating methodologies; employ different
models for rating structured products from corporate and municipal
securities; make rating performance statistics available; and more effec-
tively monitor and update ratings." 6
1°8 See id.
1°9 See id.
110 See PWG March Policy Statement, supra note 100, at 2.
In See id,
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 3.
115 Id.
tifi PWG March Policy Statement, supra note 100, at 4-5.
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In addition to proposing reforms of the credit rating agencies'
processes, the President's Working Group examined the way investors
understand and act based on ratings.I 17
 They found that,
tijn particular, many investors seem to treat a credit rating as
a "sufficient statistic" for the full range of risks associated with
an instrument, when, in fact, credit ratings are assessments of
creditworthiness, and not of liquidity, market, or other risks.
Some investors also relied exclusively on ratings for valuation
purposes. 118
To address this issue, the President's Working Group suggested that
investors, particularly those overseen by government entities, should be
required to seek out better information about the risk characteristics - of
the products they purchase and, further, that those investors develop
independent understandings of the risk characteristics of their portfo-
lios. 119
 This knowledge would supplement the credit ratings issued by
the NRSROs. 12°
C. Recent SEC Action
Following the report of the President's Working Group, the Com-
mission issued a series of proposed rules to overhaul the NRSROs and
credit ratings gen erally. 121 In three proposed rules, the SEC addressed
conflicts of interest that arise when issuers pay for ratings; required
NRSROs to distinguish ratings by using different symbols for different
types of products or disclosing the differences between the ratings;
sought to educate investors on the limits and purposes of credit ratings;
and removed the NRSRO term from some SEC rules and forms. 122
" 7 Id. at 12-14.
"8 Id. at 12.
119 Id. at 13.
128 Id.
12t References to Ratings of NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposed July 11, 2008);
Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008); Proposed Rules for
NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (proposed June 25, 2008).
122
 References to Ratings of NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,124 (proposing the amend-
ment of "five rules under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940 that rely on NRSRO ratings"); Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,106
(proposing to "replace rule and form requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that rely on security ratings ... with alternative re-
quirements"); Proposed Rules for NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. at 36,212 (seeking to impose
additional requirements on NRSROs).
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Among the proposed regulatory amendments by the SEC is a rule
to "require that as a condition to the NRSRO rating a structured fi-
nance product[,] the information provided to the NRSRO and used by
the NRSRO in determining the credit rating would need to be dis-
closed through a means designed to provide reasonably broad dissemi-
nation of the information."12" This effort would serve the SEC's goal of
increasing transparency and accountability while clarifying for investors
the nature and limitations of credit ratings. 124 Investors' reliance on
credit ratings is a key concern of the SEC, and the express purpose of at
least some of the regulatory changes is to "reduce undue reliance on
credit ratings and result in improvements in the analysis that underlies
investment decisions. " 125
Additionally, the SEC proposed a rule to replace rule and form
requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 that rely on NRSRO ratings of securities with alter-
native requirements.' 26 This would decrease the regulatory reliance on
rating agency ratings.'" The proposed rule points out that "the Com-
mission is considering whether the inclusion of requirements related to
security ratings in its rules and forms has, in effect, placed an 'official
seal of approval' on ratings that could adversely affect the quality of due
diligence and investment analysis."' 28 The SEC first began evaluating
whether or not it overly relied on credit ratings for regulatory purposes
in a 2003 Concept Release; while it did not take any action on that Re-
lease, the Commission subsequently adopted rules that did not rely on
investment grade ratings. 129
Shortly after the SEC announced these new regulations, Chairman
Christopher Cox testified before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs about the steps the Commission had taken
in light of the developing financial crisis.'" Chairman Cox highlighted
the Commission's newly acquired authority under the CRA Reform Act
123
 Proposed Rule for NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. at 86,219.
121 Rama Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses Before the Senate
Committee on Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Chris-
topher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testirnony/2008/ ts071508cc.htrn.
128 References to Ratings of NRSR0s, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,125.
128 Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,106.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 40,107.
129 Id. at 40,108.
13° Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 124 (statement of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Cortun'tt).
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to investigate and regulate credit rating agencies. 131
 In investigating,
Cox indicated that the SEC found serious problems with the three ma-
jor credit rating agencies, including a deficiency in disclosures to the
public, problems with the rating processes, and lack of attention to
conflicts of interest. 132
 In his testimony, the Chairman noted that
"[e]ven before these new rules take effect, the [credit rating agencies]
themselves have committed to the SEC that they will make changes in
their own procedures. Each of the firms [the SEC] recently examined
has agreed to take remedial measures as recommended in [its] re-
port." The Chairman further indicated that the SEC would be follow-
ing up with the credit rating agencies cited in the report to determine
whether they complied with the recommendations and would begin
examinations of the other registered NRSROs. 134
The SEC considered several of the proposed rules at a meeting on
December 3, 2008. 135
 At that time, the SEC approved final rule changes
concerning public disclosure of NRSROs' ratings performance and
methodologies, recordkeeping 'requirements, and conflicts of inter-
est. 135
 The Commission also approved a rule to amend the instructions
to Form NRSRO to require enhanced disclosures by NRSROs and by
applicants for registration as NRSROs. 137
 The enhanced disclosures in-
clude the provision of transition statistics for each asset class of credit
ratings for which the NRSRO is registering; the degree of verification
agencies conduct on the underlying assets when generating a rating;'
the role of the quality of the originator in determining a rating; and
information regarding surveillance of products once a rating has been
131 Id.
1 " STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMM. STAFF'S Ex-
AMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RA11NG AGENCIES 3 (2008), available at littp://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf;
 see also Recent Developments in U.S. Finan-
cial Markets and Regulatory Responses Before the Senate Committee on Banking; Housing and Urban
Affairs, supra note 124 (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n).
133
 See also Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 124 (statement of Chris-
topher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n).
1 " Id.
135
 Id.; Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Measures to
Strengthen Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-284.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
136 Id.
137
 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Fact Sheet from the Open Meeting of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/nrsrofactsheet-120308.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
1294	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 50:1275
assigned. Theoretically, this will increase transparency of NRSROs'
processes and allow the SEC to monitor the quality of the work being
performed.'"
Additionally, the final rules impose several new record keeping
requirements on NRSROs and require an annual report to the SEC
detailing the number of credit rating actions for each class of security
taken in the fiscal year.'" Finally, the SEC added three new prohibited
conflicts to prevent NRSROs from rating products or having individuals
participate in the rating of products where a conflict of interest ex-
ists. 140
 These conflicts include prohibiting an NRSRO from issuing a
rating with respect to an obligor or security where the NRSRO made
recommendations to the issuer about its corporate or legal structure,
assets, liabilities, or activities; prohibiting a person within an NRSRO
who participates in determining credit ratings or developing method-
ologies from also participating in fee discussions; and, perhaps obvi-
ously, prohibiting NRSRO credit analysts from receiving gifts valued at
an excess of twenty-five dollars from the issuer of the product being
rated."'
In addition to approving the final rules, the SEC proposed an
amendment to require NRSROs to disclose ratings history information
for all of their current issuer-paid credit ratings in a downloadable for-
ma - 142L They also re-proposed an amendment that would prohibit an
NRSRO from issuing a rating for a structured finance product paid for
by the product's issuer, sponsor, or underwriter unless the information
the NRSRO receives from the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter is made
available to other NRSROs. 143
 Furthermore, the Commission declined
to act on two of the releases published in July, namely, the proposal re-
garding enhanced disclosure and explanation of ratings and ratings'
products to investors, and the proposal relating to the SEC's regulatory
reliance on NRSRO ratings. 144
138 Id.
139
 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
74 Fed. Reg. 6456,6456-57 (Feb. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 17 CFR pis. 290 and 24914.
140 Id. at 6465-66.
141 Id. at 6456.
142 Id.; Fact Sheet from the Open Meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, supra note 137.
142 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
74 Fed. Reg. at 6456; Fact Sheet from the Open Meeting of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, supra note 137. This rule comes closest to reflecting the proposal
outlined in Part IV below. See infra notes 205-224 and accompanying text.
144 Casey, supra note 31.
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The final rules and these additional actions were put on hold
when the Obama administration took office, pursuant to a review by
the agency head appointed by President Obama. 145 After a review, the
rules were endorsed by the SEC (now headed by Chairman Mary
Schapiro), were published on February 9, 2009; and took effect on
April 10, 2009. 1"
III. OTHERS' PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND THE MERITS OF THOSE
PROPOSALS
Criticisms of the credit rating agencies are plentiful, especially in
the current financial climate where the impact has spread far beyond
Wall Street to blight the economy as a whole. 147
 Such criticism, however,
is not unique to the current crisis.'" In addition to proposals for re-
form from the regulators and other government entities, market ob-
servers have also participated in the debate.'" This Part will discuss
those suggestions for reform. Such suggestions include increasing the
number of NRSROs; eliminating or loosening the NRSRO designation;
increasing liability for credit rating agencies; increasing regulation of
rating procedures and methodology; and reorganizing the issuer-based
payment structure to eliminate the "pay for rating" potential.'"
A. Suggestions Within the Current Regulatory Framework
1. Increasing the Number of NRSROs
Increasing competition amongst rating agencies through the regu-
latory structure is frequently cited as a promising reform to the rating
agency marketplace. 151
 Indeed, the SEC's action to expand the number
of agencies designated as NRSROs suggests that government regulators
145
 Memorandum from Rahm Emmanuel, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff,
to Heads of Executive Dep'ts and Agencies ( Jan. 20, 2009) (available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2009/2009-11.hun) . President Obama's designee to chair the SEC, Mary
Schapiro, was sworn in on January 27, 2009. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Mary Schapiro Sworn in as Chairman of SEC ( Jan. 27, 2009).
146
 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
74 Fed. Reg. at 6456.
147 See, e.g., Frydman et. al., supra note 99; Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed
or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al.
148 See Wyatt, supra note 9.
149
 See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 66; Frydman et. al., supra note 99; Morgenson, supra
note 147; Partnoy, supra note 50.
15° See infra notes 151-204 and accompanying text.
151 See Claire H. Hill, Regulating the Ratings Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 83-84 (2004).
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support the notion that more players in the marketplace could be
beneficia1. 152 A key failure of ratings agencies is that they are notori-
ously slow at providing updated information after the initial rating and
are hesitant to do so. 153 Furthermore, once a credit rating agency is
recognized as an NRSRO, institutional entrenchment and market
forces further impede competition.'" New competitors could improve
upon the current agencies' performances by providing better ongoing
monitoring, which might improve the overall quality of ratings. 155 In
increasing the number of ratings agencies that the SEC designates as
NRSROs, the market could become more specialized as agencies would
work in particular industries; this, in and of itself, would improve the
quality of ratings through increased expertise.'"
Two concerns are typical amongst critics of increased competi-
tion.'" The first is that increased competition will result in issuers being
able to shop for better ratings, degrading the value of the rating as an
indicator of credit-worthiness.'" The second concern is that new com-
petitors will have difficulty challenging the dominance of Moody's and
Standard & Poor's because credit rating agencies rely heavily on large
infrastructures, credibility, and expertise. 159 Essentially, the primary is-
sue is that quality will suffer because newer agencies will lack the very
knowledge and skill sets that make ratings valuable.'" Or, in the alter-
native, that building up the reputation necessary to be viable in the
market does not result merely from being recognized as an NRSR0. 161
2. Increased Civil Liability for Credit Rating Agencies
A second proposal that might serve to increase the accountability
of the rating agencies and, theoretically, the quality of their work is al-
lowing for increased litigation and legal liability as a check against the
rating agencies' power. 162 The courts largely come down on the side of
162 See, e.g., Seven Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 92.
155 COFFEE, supra note 66, at 302; Morgenson, supra note 147.
154 Hill, supra note 151, at 83-84.
05 Id.
156 Id. at 85.
167 COFFEE, supra note 66, at 299-300.
Ibe Id.
156 Id. at 302.
tw Id.
01 Id.
162 Id. at 302-03; see also Rating Accountability and Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1073,
111th Cong. § 4 (2009). The Rating Accountability and Transparency Act, introduced by
Senator Jack Reed (D R.I.), provides for suits against NRSROs where the organization
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the rating agencies in these civil disputes, affording them protection
under the First Annendment. 169 Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has set a tone regarding the role of credit rat-
ings with respect to investors of credit ratings when it determined that
reliance on a credit rating was "unreasonable:164 As a result, the ratings
agencies have two safe havens from civil liability. 166
Although litigation, or an omnipresent threat of litigation, might
incentivize rating agencies to review ratings more vigorously, scholars
agree that litigation should ultimately be a recourse only in cases with a
strong inference of fraud. 166 The disadvantages of increased liability are
the potential for less-accurate ratings, increases in the cost of services,
and disproportionate remedies for liability. 167 Furthermore, ratings are
inherently subjective, and increased scrutiny would result in a plethora
of lawsuits for basic rating activities like downgrades. 168 Indeed, in-
creased litigation may be more detrimental than beneficial toward
achieving the overall goal of a better credit rating regulatory regime. 169
Thus, the promise of reform would be limited in scope, and flaws in rat-
ings are more likely to result from incompetence than fraudulence)"
3. Restoring the Principal-Agent Relationship
Restoring the principal-agent relationship would require potential
'investors or subscribers to pay for ratings, rather than issuers. 171 The
restoration of this relationship could be facilitated if the SEC took steps
to increase recognition of NRSROs that use a subscriber-based
model. 172 An examination of the credit rating agency, Egan Jones
knowingly or recklessly engaged in substandard practices in evaluating credit risk. See
S. 1073, § 4.
101 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative Sc "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Stipp. 2d 742, 816-17
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that absent actual malice, national credit rating agencies are
entitled to first amendment protection against lender's claims regarding negligent misrep-
resentation of debtor's creditworthiness).
1" See Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Co., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that reli-
ance on a credit rating was unreasonable). This is particularly ironic given the SEC's reli-
ance on ratings as a de facto regulatory standard. See id.
165 COFFEE, supra note 66, at 303.
166
 Id. at 304.
167
 Id. at 303.
100 Hill, supra note 151, at 89.
162 COFFEE, supra note 66, at 303; Hill, supra note 151, at 89.
170 See Hill, supra note 151, at 7. But see Morgenson, supra note 147 (implying that neg-
ligence or indifference may be a significant cause of failed ratings).
171 COFFEE, supra note 66, at 299.
172
 Id. at 299, 306.
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(prior to its recognition as an NRSRO), provides a recent example of
this system's potential in the marketplace.'" Egan Jones charges sub-
scribers rather than issuers for ratings. 174 As such, it seem more respon-
sive to its constituencies' demandS and changes ratings more quickly
than the large rating agencies.'" This has serious potential to minimize
the systemic weaknesses of the rating agency market by making ratings
more reflective of ongoing risk, rather than simply the creditworthiness
at the time of the initial rating.'"
Economic feasibility, however, is the central challenge to this pro-
posal. Because the process of creating a credit rating requires man-
power and technology, it is quite costly; to the issuer, unlike the inves-
tor, this investment is Financially valuable because that issuer benefits
from regulatory treatment and market credibility when it achieves a
particular rating.'" The economic benefits are far less direct when a
potential investor or subscriber pays for a product to be rated without
knowing that an investment grade rating, or a profitable investment,
will result.'" Furthermore, the very clear and concise nature of a rating
(essentially a symbol consisting of one, two, or three letters) dissemi-
nated rapidly through the technology of the information age could eas-
ily result in subscribers sharing the information with non-paying enti-
ties, thereby undermining the profitability of the venture.'" Finally, the
expansion of NRSRO recognition to emphasize firms that are driven.by
subscribers would admittedly be a complete reordering of the system,
and thus difficult to put into action from a policy perspective.m
B. Other Models of Regulation in the Securities Industry
1. Ending Regulatory Reliance
The one area where the SEC has been decidedly slower to act is in
regard to the regulatory reliance on private market credit ratings, that
is, to simply eliminate the mention of NRSROs in federal regulation. 181
173 See id. at 299.
174 Id.
175 Id.
178 Id. at 306.
In COFFEE, supra note 66, at 299.
178 See id.
178 Id. It is worth noting that empirical evidence from the Egan Jones study suggests
this does not occur. Id.
leo Id. at 347.
151 Although there is some willingness to move away from a regulatory reliance on
credit ratings, given the entrenchment of ratings and the role of credit rating agencies in
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Any analysis of the regulatory structure governing rating agencies must
begin with a discussion of the proper role for rating agencies in our
marketplace; despite having proposed rules in the summer of 2008 re-
garding regulatory references to NRSROs, the SEC declined to act on
the proposal at the December 2008 meeting. 182
 In her statement at the
December meeting, Commissioner Casey highlighted the importance
of acting on those rules;' 83
 She noted that "Ii] t is imperative that we
remove the regulatory requirements that have served to elevate
NRSRO ratings to a status that does not reflect the actual purpose and
limitations of credit ratings."184
This theory is often considered because commentators believe is-
suers have come to rely on credit ratings solely for the purpose of
achieving particular regulatory treatrnent.I85
 This perception, known as
the regulatory licensing view, holds that such ratings have little or no
informational value and are simply a mechanism for affording favor-
able regulatory treatment. 186 . It is argued that the ratings agencies bene-
fited from deeming debt to be In compliance"; thus, the central bene-
fit of a rating to an issuer is not the rating itself but the favorable
treatment that the government affords a product with that rating. 187
The empirical evidence, however, does not support the conclusion
that the sole purpose of obtaining an investment grade credit rating is
the resultant regulatory treatment. 1
 Although the regulatory implica-
tions associated with a particular credit rating can have an impact on
the rating, this in and of itself cannot explain the value of ratings agen-
cies. 189
 In fact, issuers will generally purchase credit ratings from more
than one agency, usually from the two large rating agencies, Moody's
and Standard & Poor's.'" From this, one could conclude that ending
or decreasing regulatory reliance on credit ratings would not reduce
both state and federal regulation, a full withdrawal is unlikely and infeasible. See Casey,
supra note 31.
182 See id.
las Id.
184 Id. Commissioner Casey also discussed the importance of enhancing disclosures to
investors hi order to allow for better investment decisions. Id.
11115
 Frank Partrioy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND 111E
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65,66 (Richard M. Levich et. al. eds., 2002).
1136 Id.
187 Id.
188 Hill, supra note 151, at 65-67.
189 Id. at 65-66.
160
 Id.; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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investor's reliance on credit ratings, and those ratings would have less
oversight if the NRSRO recognition were removed from regulation. 191
2. The Self-Regulatory Organization
In considering modes of overseeing and regulating credit rating
agencies, the SEC and Congress can look to archetypes from other as-
pects of the securities market. 192 Congress first recognized the value of
self-regulation generally, and self-regulatory organizations in particular,
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 193 This recognition has been
formalized in various aspects of the security industry; for example, bro-
kers and dealers ("broker-dealers") are required to register as such with
the SEC and also with a self-regulatory organization. 194
Much like the economic turmoil of today, the stock market crash
of 1929 led to efforts to improve the functioning of the securities indus-
try. The efforts by industry groups, with the backing of government
regulators, are particularly interesting.'" Initially, these efforts involved
industry associations, such as the Investment Bankers Conference (which
replaced the Investment Bankers Code Committee), acting as national
organizations with the purpose of proposing best practices for the in-
dustry. 196 In response to the establishment of these organizations, the
Commission concluded that official legal status was required to effec-
tively meet the goal of self-regulation. 197 Congress subsequently passed
19 ' See id.
192 See Securities Exchange Act § 15(b) (8), 15 U.S.0 § 78o-3 (2006). For a discussion of
the requirements for broker-dealer registration, including registration with an SRO, see SEC.
& EXCH. COMM'N, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION (2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm.
SROs assist the SEC in regulating the activities of broker-dealers. FINRA and
the national securities exchanges are all SROs.... If a broker-dealer effects
securities transactions other than on a national securities exchange of which
it is a member ... including any over-the-counter business, it must become a
member of F1NRA
Id.
192 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
194 Id. § 78o-3.
10 See JOEL SELIGMAN, Tit E TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A H ISTORY OF THE SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 183-85 (3rd ed.,
Aspen 2003) (1982) (discussing the amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that let to the creation of the National Association of Securities Dealers, the precursor to
FINRA, among other reformatory efforts).
196 See id. at 184-85. The Investment Bankers Conference and its predecessor were fo-
cused on the work of the over-the-counter securities dealers.
197 See id.
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the Maloney Act to create a statutory conceptualization of registered
national securities association self-regulatory organizations. 198
In promulgating a statutory framework to facilitate the establish-
ment of self-regulatory organizations, Congress asserted that "it was dis-
tinctly preferable to rely on cooperative regulation, in which the task
will be largely performed by representative organizations of investment
bankers, dealers, and brokers, with the Government exercising appro-
priate supervision in the public interest, and exercising supplementary
powers of direct regulation." 99
Congress, however, did not mandate private regulation at the ex-
pense of oversight by government regulators. 200
 Instead, it "determined
that the securities industry self-regulatory system would provide a
workable balance between federal and industry regulation.swi Regulat-
ing the day-to-day activities of the securities industry is extremely costly
and inefficient. 202
 Furthermore, the complexities of aspects of the secu-
rities industry, such as securities trading practices (and indeed, evaluat-
ing the creditworthiness of complex financial products) require regula-
tory oversight from parties with a comprehensive and sophisticated
understanding of the industry. 203
Although the character and physiology of self-regulatory organiza-
tions have evolved over the decades, the SEC and Congress recently
reaffirmed self-regulatory organizations' place in the regulatory frame- -
work when they oversaw and approved the consolidation of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers and some regulatory functions
of the New York Stock Exchange, two self-regulatory organizations of
broker-dealers."4
198
 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. The Maloney Act amended the Securities Exchange Act. See id.
'99 Concept Release Concerning Self Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,257-58 (pro-
posed Dec. 8, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing S. REP. No. 94-75, at 7, 11
(1975)).
214/ Id.
201 Id. at 71,256.
"2 Id.
N3 Id.
204 Consolidation of NASD and the Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working Tmeards Improved
Regulation Before the Subcom. on Securities, Ins., and Inn of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007). In July of 2007, the National Association of Securities
Dealers and some of the regulatory functions of the New York Stock Exchange Member
Regulation merged to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). About
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.firtra.org/AboutF1NRA/
 (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2009).
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IV. A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: THE
CREDIT RATING AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The SEC's current approach to reforming the regulation of credit
rating agencies is the piece-meal adoption of the many suggestions
posed by market participants and commentators. 205 According to for-
mer-Chairman Cox, the rules, "touch every aspect of the credit rating
process—from conflicts of interest to publication of ratings method-
ologies, to disclosure of ratings track records.... [T] hese rules will ad-
dress [serious deficiencies] so that investors and markets will have bet
ter information to guide investment decisions:106 The rules the SEC
has thus far acted to adopt make clearer the requirements any credit
rating agency must meet to obtain the desired NRSRO recognition. 207
Part of that process has resulted in an expansion of the number of
NRSROs in the market. 208
Although it is unclear what direction the SEC will take under the
chairmanship of Mary Schapiro, the SEC, at the urging of Congress
and the White House, is expected to continue to address the role of
credit rating agencies generally and NRSROs in particular in the finan-
cial markets. 209
The rules that have recently been considered and promulgated,
however, fail to address the root causes of the credit .rating agencies'_
role in the current financial crisis. 210 Although it is good policy to regu-
late enforcement or limit the potential for conflicts of interest, these
policies have a limited effect and likely would not have prevented the
"5 See supra notes 100-146 and accompany text.
"6 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Measures to Strengthen
Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-284.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
207 Id.
208 See Seven Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 92.
"6 Schapiro Approved as New SEC Chairman, DealBook: N.Y. Times Blog on Financial News,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/0I /23/schapiro-approved-as-new-sec-chairman/
?scp=2Sesq=mary%20schapiro&st=cse ( Jan. 23, 2009, 7:39 EST).
° References to Ratings of NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124, 40,124 (proposed July 11,
2008) (proposing the amendment of "five rules under the Investment Company Act of
1940 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 that rely on NRSRO ratings"); Security Rat-
ings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106, 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing to "replace rule and
form requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 that rely on security ratings ... with alternative requirements"); Proposed Rules for
NRSROs, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, 36,212 (proposed June 25, 2008) (seeking to impose addi-
tional requirements on NRSROs).
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current problem if the root of the problem was indeed the rapid devel-
opment of increasingly complex and misunderstood securities. 211
The key issue affecting credit ratings in the twenty-first century is
the decline in the accuracy of the credit ratings produced by credit rat-
ing agencies. 212 In order to address this issue, the SEC and Congress
should facilitate the establishment of a self-regulatory organization for
credit rating agencies as a way to improve the quality of those ratings,
which do play a vital role in helping investors (and issuers) make in-
formed decisions in our capital markets.
In the same way that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA") regulates and oversees broker dealers, an independent
regulatory authority should regulate and oversee the work of rating
agencies. 2" Their guidelines and activities would serve to supplement,
not supplant, the necessary oversight of the SEC. Thus, the regulatory
efforts undertaken by the SEC would remain in place, and additional
oversight and enforcement would come from the credit rating agency
self-regulatory organization. 214 The government should not be in the
business of acting as an NRSRO, and trying to dictate the daily work of
the rating agencies would be fiscally and politically irresponsible.
The statutory authority for recognizing a credit rating agency is
drawn from the CRA Reform Act. 2" The CRA Reform Act gives the
Commission authority to promulgate regulations that adhere to the
Act's purpose of protecting investors and the public. 216 The SEC
should, therefore, write regulations that require membership in a
credit rating self-regulatory organization in order for a credit rating
agency to obtain NRSRO recognition. 217 If, however, the Commission
was concerned that it lacked the necessary authority to require credit
211 See PWG October Policy Statement, supra note 103, at 14 ("The PWG will facilitate
• formation of a private-sector group (with representatives of investors, issuers, underwriters,
and CRAs) to develop recommendations for further steps that the issuers, underwriters,
CRAs, and policymakers could take to ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings, and
to foster appropriate use of ratings in risk assessment.").
232 See PWG March Policy Statement, supra note 100. at 1 (concluding that flaws in the
assessments of complex structured credit products contributed to the financial markets'
distress); PWG October Policy Statement, supra note 103, at 14 (same).
213 FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (providing a thorough
overview of FINRA's compliance, regulatory, education, and enforcement functions).
214 Id.
212 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a, 78o-7, Section 3(n) (2) (B)
(2006).
212 Id.
217 Id. This, of course, would require the collective action of the NRSROs to create
such a self-regulatory organization, but self-regulation is surely a more attractive option
than the external control of the SIC.
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rating agencies to register with a self-regulatory organization, it could
ask Congress to amend the definition of NRSRO in the CRA Reform
Act. 218
 The amendment would add the registration requirement to the
definition of NRSRO. 219
A credit rating agency self-regulatory organization is a valuable
weapon in the regulatory arsenal that can be achieved without the gov-
ernment incurring the monetary or political costs of becoming intri-
cately involved in the credit rating process or trying to end reliance on
credit ratings. 22° Much like FINRA, which is funded by collecting fees
from member firms, a self-regulatory organization overseeing rating
agencies could look to credit rating agencies to fund its operations
through membership con tributions. 221
An obvious criticism of the self-regulatory organization approach is
the potential for lax regulation by an organization with close ties to the
industry it oversees. 222 Congress, however, recognizes that active partici-
pants in an industry can "bring down to bear on the problems of regula-
tion a degree of expertise and, in many circumstances, expedition not
expected of a necessarily more remote governmental agency." 2" Indeed,
a credit rating agency self-regulatory organization would provide those
agencies with a forum for facilitating the education of analysts, devising
industry-wide best practices, and promulgating self-regulations. 224
CONCLUSION
Credit rating agencies and ratings play an important role in the
functioning of capital markets. Investors lack the expertise and re-
sources to develop a thorough appreciation of the myriad of sophisti-
cated financial products in which they seek to invest. As such, credit
rating agencies have played an important role in the markets for nearly
a century. In general, investors have stored a great deal of faith in the
ratings produced by the three largest credit rating agencies, and this
2115 Id. §§ 78a, 78o-7.
219 Id.
220 See FIN. INDUS. REGULVIORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 08-07, REGULATORY PRIG-
ING PROPOSAL. 1 (2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/
@notice/documents/notices/p038008.pdf.
221 Id.
222 See 1961-1963 Special Study of Securities Markets, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Report on Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95 (1963).
223 Concept Release Concerning Self Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,258 n.37
(proposed Dec. B, 2004).
224 FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (providing a thorough
overview of FINRA's compliance, regulatory, education, and enforcement functions).
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trust largely has been validated by the SEC's similar reliance on the rat-
ings of designated agencies in its regulatory constructions.
As the critics have suggested, the SEC has indicated it might take
action to reduce reliance on NRSRO credit ratings by increasing inves-
tor understanding of the credit ratings and by reducing the regulatory
reliance on those ratings. The SEC should seek to ensure the transpar-
ency and integrity of the markets by facilitating the formation of a self-
regulatory organization with oversight of and responsibility for credit
rating agencies. This self-regulatory organization and its regulations
should work in concert with the Commission's own regulatory efforts.
The responsibilities of such an organization could be varied but should
include oversight of credit rating methodologies as well as auditing of
the ratings processes applied to all financial products.
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